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Texans believe they own the water beneath their land and 
can freely sell or lease their water rights, but a patchwork 
of Groundwater Conservation Districts (GCDs) restrict 
such transactions. As a result, groundwater rights have 
become a phantom. 
In his seminal work, Mystery 
of Capital, economist Hernan-
do De Soto concluded that a 
system of formal property 
rights, wherein working cap-
ital is easily bought and sold,  
enables the creation of mod-
ern markets and fosters 
strong economic growth. Al-
ternatively, ill-defined and 
inconsistent property rights 
can result in dead capital 
with limited economic po-
tential. Unfortunately, even 
in places with a history of 
protecting property owners, 
such as Texas, dead capital 
exists beneath the surface. 
GROUNDWATER RIGHTS 
AND RULES IN TEXAS 
When the Supreme Court of 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Texas groundwater regulations  
create confusion between what 
people think they own and 
what they actually own.  
 
Texas has ample groundwater 
supplies, but a patchwork of 
regulations prevents market 
forces from guiding 
groundwater to its best use. 
 
Changing how groundwater is 
regulated would strengthen 
property rights and eliminate 
regulation-induced shortages. 
2 Texas issued its first groundwater rights rul-
ing in 1904, it laid a foundation for ground-
water jurisprudence that has endured for 
over a century. The ruling (in Houston Texas 
Central Railroad Company v. W.A. East) as-
serted that because groundwater’s move-
ment is indeterminable, ownership occurs at 
the point of capture—and thus, the rule of 
capture was born.1 
While subsequent judicial interpretation has 
strongly upheld private ownership and the 
rule of capture,2 the Conservation Amend-
ment (Art. XVI, §59) of the Texas Constitu-
tion charged the legislature with conserva-
tion and development of all Texas’ natural 
resources. Due to significant groundwater 
withdrawals from the Ogallala aquifer, the 
51st Texas Legislature passed the Ground-
water Conservation District Act of 1949. Fig-
ure 1 shows a map of the resulting Balkan-
ized patchwork of groundwater districts, 
often spanning only one or two counties.3 
GCDs can control the issuance of pumping 
permits, well spacing, and even exportation 
of groundwater outside their boundaries.  
PHANTOM CAPITAL 
Over time, many landowners attempting to 
lease, sell, or otherwise utilize groundwater 
have been frustrated to the point of litiga-
tion by GCD controls over pumping permits. 
A classic case of such frustration involves 
Clayton Williams’ attempt to transfer his 
pumping rights from irrigation to municipal 
use in order to export water outside the lo-
cal GCD. Williams wanted to sell groundwa-
ter to the Midland and Odessa area while 
scaling back agricultural production. The 
Middle Pecos GCD board of directors and the 
subsequent judicial appeal, however, denied 
the permit.4 Essentially, the disagreement 
was not about the amount of groundwater 
being pumped; rather, it involved the diver-
sion from irrigation to municipal use. While 
Williams’ groundwater capital is not com-
pletely dead because he can still use it for 
irrigation, the policies implemented by the 
Middle Pecos GCD have artificially reduced 
its value.  
CONSERVATION CONCERNS  
Yet, most observers recognize the need for 
some form of regulation. While the rule of 
capture system in Texas may have operated 
effectively when groundwater was abundant 
and the population was much smaller, the 
onset of droughts and increased usage 
changes things. Returning to the rule of cap-
ture with unrestricted pumping of ground-
water would be a serious mistake. However, 
allocating groundwater towards its best use 
could be significantly advanced by amending 
the current regulatory system. 
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Source: The Texas Water Development Board  
Figure 1: Groundwater Conservation Districts 
REGULATION GONE AWRY 
In theory, GCDs are positioned to promote 
conservation, prevent overly rapid depletion 
of key aquifers, and aid the flow of ground-
water to its best use. Unfortunately, they are 
executors of a flawed regulatory system. In 
effect, GCDs create small local monopolies 
where the cost of water is not reflective of 
actual groundwater scarcity and needs. 
Figure 2 illustrates the number of years sup-
ply available in each of the nine major Texas 
aquifers, assuming that consumption from 
each aquifer grows at its historical rate. As 
the figure illustrates, groundwater is partic-
ularly scarce in the Ogallala (36 years) and 
Hueco-Mesilla (49 years) aquifers and abun-
dant (>1,000 years) in the seven aquifers 
located in more populous areas.  
If the cost of water reflected this actual pat-
tern of scarcity, then we would expect to see 
water being exported from locations where 
it is abundant and imported into locations 
where it is relatively scarce. Instead, only 6 
of the GCDs exported more than 1% of total 
produced water, and groundwater prices 
have become unreasonably high in certain 
areas and unreasonably low in others.  
If groundwater were allocated on a property 
right-based system, a more effective market 
reflecting true prices would emerge and lead 
to improved resource allocation across the 
state. Simple changes such as preventing 
GCDs from regulating groundwater based on 
its intended use or final destination would 
provide an opportunity for the free market 
to facilitate groundwater going to its best 
use.  
REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 
As outlined in our team’s report to Texas 
Comptroller Glenn Hagar, there are four al-
ternative regulatory structures that would 
revive Texas phantom capital:  
 Maintaining the existing GCD structure 
but changing the regulatory process;   
 Replacing the GCDs with aquifer-based 
regulatory authorities; 
 Replacing the GCDs with a statewide 
groundwater agency; or 
 Creating groundwater bank accounts.5 
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If groundwater were 
allocated on a property 
right-based system, a 
more effective market 
reflecting accurate prices 
would emerge and lead to 
better resource allocation 
across the state 
Figure 2: Texas Aquifers—Years of Supply, 
assuming  historical growth rates 
Source:  Brady et al. (2016) based on data from The 
Texas Water Development Board  
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Available at: http://scholarworks.sfasu.edu/ethj/vol50/
iss2/13  
2 Brady, R., Beckermann, W., Capps, A., Kennedy, B., 
McGee, P., Northcutt, K., Parish, M., Qadeer, A., & Shan, S. 
(2016, May). Reorganizing Groundwater Regulation in 
Texas, A Bush School Capstone Report to Hon. Glenn 
Hegar, Texas State Comptroller of Public Accounts. http://
bush.tamu.edu/psaa/capstones/Final%20Report%
20Reorganizing%20Groundwater%20Regulation%20in%
20Texas%20(3).pdf 
3  The map also includes the Fort Bend and Harris-
Galveston Subsidence Districts. 
4 Beal, B. (2015, September 23). Williams permit denial 
upheld. The Fort Stockton Pioneer. Retrieved 11/24/2015 
from http://www.fortstocktonpioneer.com/community/
article_1be7f5da-621a-11e5-b007-4fb64d98be6c.html  
5 Brady et al. (2016). 
Each of these options would greatly improve 
the allocation of water resources within Texas 
and would eliminate a regulatory system 
which indirectly and artificially determines 
the value of what should be a private property 
right.   
Texas groundwater supplies are ample, but 
current regulation has caused them to be-
come phantom capital with limited invest-
ment potential. Regulatory changes are need-
ed that respect the rights of property owners 
and use market forces to promote the prudent 
best use of Texas’ groundwater resources. 
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To share your thoughts 
on The Takeaway, 
please visit  
http://bit.ly/1ABajdH  
This policy brief draws heavily from a 2016 
Bush School capstone report, Reorganizing  
Groundwater Regulation in Texas, by Ross 
Brady, Wayne Beckermann, Amber Capps, 
Braden Kennedy, Peyton McGee, Kayla 
Northcut, Mason Parish, Abdullilah Qadeer, 
and Shuting Shan. Their faculty advisor was 
Dr. James M. Griffin. 
A video of their presentation to the client can 
be found at https://youtu.be/Xc7Lfql7fEs. 
